Using new time-series data for the size of the Canadian underground economy, we examine the relationship between unreported and measured GDP in that country. Granger causality tests are conducted, with a proper allowance for the non-stationarity of the data. We find that there is clear evidence of such causality from measured GDP to "hidden" output, but only very mild evidence of Granger causality in the reverse direction. This result supports similar evidence for New Zealand reported by the first author, and has several interesting policy implications.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a significant resurgence of interest in the underground economy in various countries. This has been driven in part by the recognition that the size of the underground economy is growing in both absolute and relative terms internationally. There is now comprehensive evidence that the hidden economy, expressed as a percentage of measured GDP for comparative purposes, has been growing quite steadily over the past two or three decades in virtually every country that has been studied. For example, Schneider and Enste (1998) document this phenomenon for sixty-seven countries. A very detailed analysis of this situation in New Zealand is discussed by Giles (1997a Giles ( , 1997b Giles ( , 1999a Giles ( , 1999b Giles ( , 1999c ; and similar evidence for Canada is provided by Giles and Tedds (2000) .
The growth in the underground economy and tax evasion can been explained by the corresponding increase in effective tax rates in many countries, rising regulatory activity in certain jurisdictions, and a general decline in ethical standards (e.g., Caragata and Giles 1999; Giles and Caragata, 1999; Schneider and Enste, 1998) . Demographic trends and an increase in the number of home-based businesses are also important factors in countries such as Canada.
In this context it is interesting to investigate the nature of the relationship between unreported and measured output. A rise in the relative size of the underground economy (i.e., in the ratio of hidden to measured GDP) is the net result of the underground economy growing at a faster rate than GDP. This raises important policy questions, such as: to what extent is the flight underground retarding measured economic growth? What is the connection between the measured and unmeasured business cycles? Giles (1997a Giles ( , 1997b Giles ( , 1999a has previously addressed these questions in relation to the New Zealand underground economy.
In this paper we use new time-series data on the Canadian underground economy compiled by Giles and Tedds (2000) to examine the causal relationship between the underground and reported economies in that country. The results reported below provide strong support for the conclusions reached by Giles (1997a) .
II. DATA ISSUES
Following earlier work by Tedds (1998) , recent research by Giles and Tedds (2000) well with the results of Schneider and Enste (1998) . Using a different approach to ours, they obtain a figure of about 15% of GDP in the mid 1990's. Using the actual real measured GDP data for Canada over this period 3 we can then obtain a corresponding real dollar series for the underground economy (UE), which ranges from about C$13Billion in 1976 to about C$96Billion in 1995, in constant 1986 dollar terms 4 . Visually, the data for measured and underground real output each appear non-stationary, so care has to be taken when testing for Granger causality between them.
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In order to apply our chosen procedure for testing for Granger causality, namely that suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) , we need to determine the maximum order of integration of each of the series being studied. To do this we have used 5 the standard "augmented" Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (e.g., Fuller, 1979,1981; Said and Dickey, 1984) . Dods and Giles (1995) show that the default method of obtaining the augmentation level, p, in the SHAZAM (1997) package is a good choice for samples of our size if one wishes to avoid a finite-sample sizedistortion in the implementation of these tests. With respect to the inclusion of drift and/or trend terms in the ADF regression, we follow the sequential strategy of Dolado et al. (1990) , which is also used in this context by Giles (1997a) . To test that the series x t is I(1), against the alternative that x t is I(0) (or stationary) the level of augmentation, p, is determined as above, in the context of the following full ADF regression:
We test H o : γ = 0 vs. H A : γ < 0 using the Dickey-Fuller "t" test (denoted "t dt " below) and
MacKinnon's (1991) critical values. If H 0 is rejected, we conclude that x t is stationary, otherwise we test H 0 : β = γ = 0, using the "F-test" (denoted "F ut " below) of Dickey and Fuller (1981) . A rejection implies that x t is I(1); otherwise we remove the trend from (1) and test H 0 : γ = 0 vs. H A : γ < 0. The ADF "t-statistic" is denoted "t d ". If we cannot reject H 0 , we test H 0 : α = γ = 0 using the "F-test" (denoted "F ud " below) of Dickey and Fuller (1981) . A rejection implies that x t is I(1);
otherwise we remove the drift term and re-estimate (1), and test H 0 : γ = 0 vs. H A : γ < 0. This "tstatistic" is denoted "t" in Table 1 . A rejection suggests that x t is I(0), while failing to reject suggests that x t is I(1).
As some economic time-series are I(2), we test I(3) against I(2) (applying the above analysis to the doubly-first-differenced data); then if we reject I(3) we test I(2) against I(1) (using the firstdifferences of the data), and we finally test I(1) against I(0), if necessary (following Dickey and Pantula,1987) . The results of this analysis appear 6 in Table 1 , where we see that real GDP is I(1), but we cannot reject the hypothesis that UE is I(2). This is an interesting result, and is contrary to
Giles' (1997a) finding for New Zealand. Its economic implications are discussed below in Section IV.
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III. MODEL ESTIMATION AND GRANGER CAUSALITY
We have used a two-equation VAR model, and the methodology of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to identify the direction(s) of any causality between GDP and UE. Care must be taken in the way that this testing is performed if the usual test statistics are to have standard asymptotic distributions in the presence of non-stationary data such as ours. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) show that this standard asymptotic theory holds if we determine the lags in the VAR equations in the usual way, but then we add extra lags of the variables, equal in number to the maximum [ Table 2 About Here]
Using the Schwartz Criterion and Akaiake's Information Criterion to determine the lag lengths,
we have constructed two-equation VAR models for the following three cases: no constant and no trend; constant but no trend; and constant and linear trend. The results of estimating these models by maximum likelihood, using the SHAZAM (1997) package, appear in Table 2 . We see there Of course, this presupposes the existence of causality between these variables. The results of applying the Wald tests for Granger non-causality to the "augmented" VAR models appear in Table 3 , together with various diagnostic tests, suitably modified to allow for their application in the context of a jointly-estimated system 7 . All of these tests have only asymptotic justification, so we used "bootstrap" simulation, with 5,000 replications, to obtain their exact p-values. These are also reported in Table 3 , and on this basis the diagnostic tests suggest that the VAR models on which the Wald-testing is based are quite well specified. We also see there is strong evidence of causality from GDP to UE. (We clearly reject non-causality in this direction.) There is only very mild evidence that the causality is bi-directional. (Only in the constant/trend model do we reject the absence of causality from UE to GDP at the 10% significance level, but not at the 5% or 1% levels.)
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IV. Economic Implications
These causality results accord entirely with those of Giles (1997a) for the New Zealand underground and measured economies. The clear evidence of causality from measured to hidden output poses an interesting dilemma for policy-makers. If expansionary monetary or fiscal policies are used to stimulate measured output, then it seems that this will also have a subsequent effect on the size of the underground economy. The positive coefficients on the lagged GDP variables in the UE equations in our VAR models reported in Table 2 imply that this effect will also be an expansionary one. That is, both the measured and hidden economies will be stimulated in the same direction. It then remains to determine whether the relative size of the underground economy, (UE/GDP), will increase or decrease.
Taking up this last point, the results of Caragata and Giles (1999) and Caragata and Giles (1999) for New Zealand show clearly that an expansionary fiscal policy (through a reduction in the effective tax rate) will lead to a reduction in (UE/GDP), ceteris paribus. Giles and Tedds (2000) show that the same is true in the Canadian case. In essence, the size of the hidden economy shrinks, and measured GDP increases. The latter arises partly because of the direct stimulation of this fiscal policy, and partly because previously at least some unmeasured output is now measured. In fact government revenue can also rise (notwithstanding the tax-cut), given the increase in the tax-base. The propensity for this to occur depends, of course, on the magnitude of the cut, and the initial effective tax rate.
To the best of our knowledge, there is virtually no corresponding empirical evidence available regarding the relationship between monetary policy changes and the relative size of the underground economy 8 . The analysis of Langfeldt (1985) suggests that changes in the money supply appear to have little direct effect on the hidden economy. However, as in several other countries, monetary policy in Canada is now directed towards maintaining inflation within a narrow band, and there is empirical evidence (e.g., Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984; Tedds, 1998 ) that inflation is a causal factor of underground activity. So, one would anticipate an indirect link between monetary policy changes and unrecorded output.
The apparent absence of any significant causality from the underground economy to measured output is also interesting from a policy perspective. The negative coefficients on the lagged UE variables in the GDP equations, as reported in Table 2 , suggest that an increase in the hidden economy may have a negative impact on measured economic growth. However, these coefficient estimates are generally insignificant. The absence of causality is consistent with the observed concurrent growth of both of these sectors in Canada in recent years. It also suggests that policy changes such as more stringent penalties for tax evasion, intended to combat the growth of the underground economy, will not necessarily by themselves stimulate measured output. This is a serious issue in the Canadian context, especially given the fact that recent attempts by Revenue Canada's "Underground Economy Initiative" to increase compliance enforcement apparently has met with limited success 9 .
Finally, the results of the unit root testing in Table 1 imply that the Canadian underground and measured economies cannot be cointegrated as the series are integrated of different orders
10
. That is, in the face of a shock to one of these series, there is no linear long-run equilibrating mechanism that will prevent these two economic variables from moving further and further apart over time. From a policy perspective, this has serious implications. For example, in the context of the recent and present "tax revolt" in that country, this means that any adverse growth effects arising from the increased tendency of agents to "go underground" are unlikely to be short-lived, unless direct policy actions (such as a reduction in the tax burden) are taken.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have used new time-series data for the Canadian underground economy to explore some of the basic linkages between measured and hidden output in that country from the mid 1970's to the mid 1990's. Many of our results are strikingly similar to those that are available for the New Zealand underground economy. We find that there is no evidence of a long-run equilibrating mechanism linking the measured and unrecorded sectors, but that there is strong evidence of Granger causality from the former to the latter. There is only slight evidence of reverse causality.
Fiscal and monetary shocks will impact on both measured and underground output, and the net effect on the relative size of the underground sector is ambiguous, a priori. Other work by the authors (Giles and Tedds, 2000) addresses the relationship between changes in the effective tax 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 0 
